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HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY.  
By Laurence R. Tancredi.  Cambridge University Press 2005.  Pp. 226.  
$28.99.  ISBN: 0-521-86001-6. 
The field of neuroethics has been described as an amalgamation of 
two branches of inquiry: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience 
of ethics.  The ethics of neuroscience, which has received considerable 
attention over the past three to four years, is concerned with the ethical 
principles that should guide brain research and the treatment of 
neurological disease, as well as the effects that advances in neuroscience 
have on our social, moral, and philosophical views.  The neuroscience of 
ethics, which has received considerably less attention, may be described 
as a scientific approach to understanding ethical behavior.1  Psychiatrist 
and lawyer Laurence Tancredi makes a significant and early 
contribution to the neuroscience of ethics in Hardwired Behavior: What 
Neuroscience Reveals About Morality. 
Tancredi begins by developing a historical framework for 
understanding community notions of morality.  Moral proscriptions on 
behavior originated in ancient philosophy, were illustrated in classic 
literature, and continue to be identified by the western Judeo-Christian 
tradition and the religions of Islam and the Far East.  Common precepts 
of morality include bans on negative behaviors such as murder, 
infidelity, greed, sloth, and manipulation.  Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, 
Lawrence Kohlberg, and other early experts in moral development 
viewed these negative behaviors through the lens of mentalism, a focus 
on the mind as separate from the brain and the body.  Central to 
mentalism are the concepts of free will and intentionality—the belief 
that individuals can choose whether to engage in immoral acts. 
Tancredi chronicles the transition from mentalism to physicalism, 
which emphasizes the primacy of the physical brain.  Although 
physicalism dates back to Aristotle and the principles of natural law, 
advances in neuroscience have brought it to the level of brain biology.  
Tancredi’s focus is the role of biology in immoral behavior, which he 
examines through a series of case studies, beginning with infamous 
Ricky Green. (46-68)  Green, who had a long history of physical and 
                                                          
 1. Adina Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, in 
Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy 18 (Judy Illes ed., Oxford U. 
Press 2006). 
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sexual abuse, sexually mutilated and killed at least two women and two 
men.  Tancredi avoids the nature-nurture dichotomy by suggesting that 
Green’s behavior resulted from a combination of selection factors (the 
genetic capacity for transferring a trait) and instruction (an 
environmental agent that triggers the innate capacity present in the 
genes). (64-66, 81)  Stated another way, Green’s genes and biology 
(including an ineffective limbic system and an abnormal prefrontal 
cortex), as well as environmental influences, may have contributed to his 
behavior. 
Tancredi uses additional case studies and research findings to 
further illustrate the role of the brain in moral decision-making.  A case 
study involving a failed heterosexual relationship is used to suggest that 
men who have structural and functional abnormalities in the 
orbitofrontal gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, 
and superior temporal sulcus may have reduced capacity for empathy, an 
essential component for developing a moral sense. (112)  Hypersexuality 
may result from damage to the limbic system, and poor financial 
planning skills may be due to frontal lobe injury.  The cases of Andrea 
Yates, Susan Smith,2 Martha Stewart, and Enron allow for a discussion 
of the role of the brain in cases involving “madness” and “badness,” as 
well as individual and corporate greed.  Drawing on his experience as a 
psychiatrist, Tancredi believes that criminal money-related behaviors 
frequently stem from bipolar illness, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
a pathological fear of failure—disorders involving major parts of the 
brain, including the prefrontal and temporal lobes and the amygdala. 
In his final chapter, Tancredi considers a hypothetical legislative 
program set in the year 2100 that supports the use of functional 
neuroimaging technology and brain treatments to curtail immoral 
behavior, ensure acceptable expressions of sexual desires, and limit 
wasteful spending activities, including gambling.  Among other 
measures, the hypothetical reforms require genetic and functional 
neuroimaging testing of all babies to identify their potential range of 
behavior, as well as the augmentation or replacement of the areas of the 
brain that contribute to immoral decision-making.  The program’s 
underlying assumption is that free will, if it exists at all, plays a minor 
role in morality.  Briefly switching approaches from the neuroscience of 
ethics to the ethics of neuroscience, Tancredi compares the issues raised 
                                                          
 2. Texas mother Andrea Yates, who suffered from psychotic hallucinations and delusions, 
drowned her five children in a bathtub in 2001.  South Carolina mother Susan Smith rolled her 
Mazda—and her two children—into a lake in an attempt to secure the affection of her lover in 
1995. 
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by his hypothetical program to current questions relating to the proper 
use of Prozac and Ritalin.  Tancredi concludes by arguing that we need 
to balance the merits of a moral (and monolithic) society against the loss 
of individuality and diversity that could result from legislative reforms. 
(171-172) 
Scientists who believe that modern brain imaging techniques only 
reveal the neural correlates of behavior, not the “hardwiring” of 
behavior,3 may struggle with Tancredi’s broad notion of defective brain 
wiring.  Other individuals may question the diminished role Tancredi 
assigns to free will.  Still others may disagree with Tancredi’s 
speculation that law enforcement agencies, educational institutions, and 
the health care system will extensively incorporate neuroimaging 
technology into their business processes.  And, scholars in religion may 
wish to inquire further about neuroscience’s implications for religious 
understandings of morality.  However, Hardwired Behavior more than 
accomplishes Tancredi’s goal, which is to generate discussion about the 
effect of recent neuroscientific findings on our moral and religious 
precepts. 
 
Stacey A. Tovino† 
                                                          
 3. See e.g. Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race, Behavior, and the Brain: The 
Role of Neuroimaging in Understanding Complex Social Behaviors, 24 Political Psychol. 747, 754 
(2003) (“Showing a behavior ‘in the brain’ does not mean that it is innate, ‘hardwired,’ or 
unchangeable.”). 
 † Assistant Professor, Hamline University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. 
